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I. INTRODUCTION
 It is hard to think of any contemporary writers who have done 
more than John Goldberg and Ben Zipursky to reassert and reinvig-
orate what might be called the classical interpretation of the common 
law of torts. I, for one, am greatly in their debt. They have taught me 
a great deal, not only about torts but also about how to combine legal 
argument felicitously with philosophical insight and historical schol-
arship. Like them, and partly because of them, I believe that the clas-
sical interpretation is the correct one. Other familiar ways of explaining 
what is going on in the common law of torts, while often illuminating in 
their own ways, are parasitic. They rely on the classical interpretation, 
often surreptitiously, for their appeal or even their intelligibility.  
 Given Goldberg’s and Zipursky’s influence over my own thinking, 
it hardly comes as a surprise that I have few significant disagree-
ments with them. I do think, however, that they tend to equivocate 
on an important point of law in a way that puts them at odds with 
some writers with whom they would do better to make common 
cause. This charge of equivocation is one that I make only with grave 
misgivings. I have these misgivings not only because Goldberg and 
Zipursky stand out among theorists of tort law for their detailed 
knowledge of and sustained interest in legal doctrine, which they 
usually go to great lengths to spell out clearly, but also because I am 
not sure to which body of law, exactly, their treatment should be held 
answerable. They give the impression that they are writing about the 
tort law of the United States of America. But it is doubtful whether 
there is such a thing. There are at least fifty-one legal systems in the 
 *  Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Oxford. For their many valuable com-
ments on a first draft, I would like to thank the participants in the Symposium on Civil 
Recourse Theory, which took place on February 11-12, 2011, at The Florida State Universi-
ty College of Law. My final draft was saved from further errors by Ben Zipursky, to whom I 
owe special thanks. 
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United States with tort jurisdictions. Even if a national tort law can 
be distilled from this melée, it might well be hard to determine what 
it says on the point of law I have in mind. U.S. legal systems, unlike 
other common law legal systems, tend to use jury trials for the bulk 
of their tort litigation. It may be that trial judges tend to pass the 
buck to the jury on the point in question, and appellate judges then 
stay clear of it, with the result that the legal position is indetermi-
nate. In that case, there is no point of law for Goldberg and Zipursky 
to report, equivocally or otherwise. 
 In what follows, I will focus my attention on the law of torts, not 
in the United States, but in some other major common law jurisdic-
tions (England and Wales, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) in 
which tort cases are normally adjudicated by judges sitting without 
juries. So far as I am aware, these legal systems are all determinate, 
and all agree, on the point of law in question. If tort law in the Unit-
ed States is not determinate, or is determinate but does not agree, 
then what I am calling Goldberg and Zipursky’s equivocation is really 
something else. It is really their testimony to a respect in which the 
law of the United States has parted company with the law in the rest 
of the common law world. The problem, an English lawyer might 
then teasingly say, is with American tort law rather than with the 
Goldberg and Zipursky rendition of it. If that turns out to be the right 
diagnosis, then it goes a long way to explain why (as Goldberg and 
Zipursky lament) “academics [in America] have lost their feel for this 
basic legal category[, viz., tort].”1 For, as I hope to show, one cannot 
have a proper feel for the category until one takes to heart this point 
of law that has only faltering or grudging recognition in the Goldberg 
and Zipursky analysis. 
II. LOCATING THE LAW OF TORTS
 Goldberg and Zipursky famously say that “civil recourse” is a de-
fining feature of the law of torts.2 I could not agree more. To spell the 
claim out: There is no law of torts if there is no legal power for some-
one who holds herself to have been on the receiving end of a tort (a 
plaintiff) to summon the alleged tortfeasor (a defendant) before the 
courts, and to do so unilaterally (without the leave of any official), 
 1.  John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV.
917, 919 (2010). I am relying principally on this article as a conspectus of Goldberg and 
Zipursky’s views, since it is a recent restatement. They have openly changed their minds 
over time on a number of points, so trawling through their extensive oeuvre may sometimes 
lead one astray. Having said that, I will also refer in Part V below to Zipursky’s important 
sole-authored article Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, which deepens the theoretical 
foundations. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J.
695 (2003).  
 2. See, e.g., Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 946. 
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with a goal of obtaining a court-imposed or court-approved remedy 
against that defendant. It is then for the defendant, not any official, 
to apply for the case to be struck out. Otherwise, the case marches on 
to trial, and in the absence of any defence, it marches on at the sole 
instance of the plaintiff to the judgment and the award of a remedy 
against the defendant. This feature (or set of features) amply distin-
guishes the law of torts from the criminal law and from most, if not 
all, public law.3 In criminal law, even where private prosecutions are 
possible, they can be taken over (and discontinued) by the prosecuto-
rial authorities. In public law, a cause of action is available, in gen-
eral, only with leave of the court. The unilateral power of the plaintiff 
is limited to applying for leave of the court, which issues the writ 
(traditionally certiorari, mandamus, prohibito, or habeas corpus) on 
the application of (or ex parte) the plaintiff. Public law and criminal 
law therefore lack the defining apparatus of civil recourse. 
 Yet there is nothing here to help us distinguish the law of torts 
from the rest of private law. Indeed civil recourse, as I have just ex-
plained it, is a defining feature of private law as a whole in the common 
law systems. It is equally a feature of the law of breach of contract, 
the law of unjust enrichment, and the law of equitable (including 
trustee) liability. What do Goldberg and Zipursky say to help us un-
derstand how the law of torts is different from these other depart-
ments of private law? 
 Here is one thing they say: Torts are wrongs, so that the tort 
plaintiff seeking recourse necessarily alleges (whether expressly or 
by implication) that she has been wronged by the defendant—that 
the tortfeasor has violated her rights—and that she is entitled to 
have a remedy against him on that very ground.4 Again, I could not 
 3.  Some statutory causes of action are sui generis and hard to classify as public or 
private, so I am hedging my bets with “most, if not all.” For example, the cause of action 
against public authorities under the Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42, § 7 (Eng.) is not a cause 
of action in tort, and “damages” under section 8 are not to be measured on tort law princi-
ples. See R (Greenfield) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2005] UKHL 14, [2005] 1 
W.L.R. 673, [19] (appeal taken from Eng.). “[T]he 1998 Act,” said Lord Bingham, “is not a 
tort statute.” Id. Nevertheless, there is civil recourse under the Act in the Goldberg-
Zipursky sense. For similar examples, see Maharaj v. Attorney-General of Trinidad and 
Tobago (No 2) [1979] A.C. 385 (P.C.) 399 (appeal taken from Trin. & Tobago), Kearney v. 
Minister for Justice, [1986] I.R. 116 (H. Ct.), Simpson v Attorney-General [1994] 3 NZLR 
667 (CA), and Taunoa v Attorney General [2008] 1 NZLR 429 (SC). But cf. Crossman v. R, 
[1984] 1 F.C. 681 (Can.) (violation of a Canadian Charter right classed and treated as a 
tort). Goldberg and Zipursky lead us to believe that the latter is also the Federal United 
States position, although the leading case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed-
eral Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) seems to me to point the other way. See
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 939. The Goldberg and Zipursky talk of “constitu-
tional torts” in this context may, of course, incorporate their own (I will suggest insuffi-
ciently discriminating) analysis of what a tort is. 
 4.  See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 918. 
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agree more. Torts are legal wrongs, i.e., breaches of legal duties or 
obligations,5 and they are legal wrongs against particular people, i.e., 
they violate a particular person’s legal rights. But this feature (or set 
of features) still does not help to distinguish the law of torts from the 
law of breach of contract or from the law of equitable liability. It only 
helps to distinguish it from the law of unjust enrichment. Although a 
wrongdoer may be unjustly enriched by his wrong, the success of a 
claim against him for unjust enrichment does not depend on his hav-
ing been a wrongdoer.6 It is enough that, were he to keep his gains at 
the plaintiff’s expense, that would be a wrong against the plaintiff. 
Or, to put the contrast differently, the law of unjust enrichment of-
fers remedies for what would be wrongs if not remedied, whereas the 
law of torts and the law of breach of contract offer remedies for what 
are already wrongs at the time of the remedy on the ground that they 
are already wrongs. 
 On this point, as Goldberg and Zipursky point out, many have 
abandoned the classical interpretation of the law of torts. Following 
in Holmes’s footsteps, those who have abandonded the classical in-
terpretation have said that the law of torts and the law of breach of 
contract are, in the respect just discussed, no different from the law 
of unjust enrichment. The nomenclature notwithstanding, it is not 
wrong to commit a tort or to breach a contract. The only wrong (if 
there is one) is to not pay the price when one does.7 Goldberg and 
Zipursky will have none of this. They argue that the supposed coun-
terexamples to the thesis—that torts are wrongs—are not counterex-
amples at all (the trespass in Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation 
Co., for example)8 or, if they are counterexamples, that they should 
be regarded as peripheral (the innominate tort in Rylands v. Fletch-
er).9 Here Goldberg and Zipursky stand shoulder to shoulder with 
those who have exposed the Holmesian heresy (later an economistic 
 5.  In this Article, I will mainly speak of “duty,” but I could equally have chosen “obli-
gation,” which means exactly the same. 
 6.  For painstaking analysis, see PETER BIRKS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 11-38 (2d ed. 2005). 
 7.  See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 
(1897). I should mention that, although I repeat it here, the attribution of this view to 
Holmes himself is contested. Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Effi-
cient Breach and Tortious Interference, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085 (2000). 
 8.  See JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT
LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 783-90 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing Vincent v. Lake Erie 
Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910)). The discussion is cited approvingly in Goldberg & 
Zipursky, supra note 1, at 953 n.181. 
 9.  See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 951-52 (discussing Rylands v. Fletcher, 
(1868) 3 L.R.E. & I. App. (H.L.) 330 (appeal taken from Eng.)). Personally, I would tend to 
class Rylands with Vincent as not a counterexample at all. See John Gardner, Obligations 
and Outcomes in the Law of Torts, in RELATING TO RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS FOR TONY
HONORÉ ON HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 123-43 (Peter Cane & John Gardner eds., 2001). 
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orthodoxy) about breach of contract for the mistake it is.10 In the process, 
they implicitly maintain the classical continuity between the law of 
torts and the law of breach of contract and draw the classical contrast 
between these two areas of law and the law of unjust enrichment. 
 So Goldberg and Zipursky agree that the law of breach of contract 
and the law of torts share the twin defining features mentioned so far 
(civil recourse and for wrongs). They presumably think, and they 
would be right to think, that torts and breaches of contract differ 
from each other in some other yet-to-be-identified respect. But they 
say nothing at all about what I have called equitable liability, at least 
some of which is liability for wrongdoing. A breach of trust; a breach 
of fiduciary duty as a company director, attorney, or agent; and a 
breach of confidence—all these are equitable wrongs for which there 
is undoubtedly civil recourse against the wrongdoer. Goldberg and 
Zipursky ignore these wrongs. Indeed, they do not seem to leave any 
separate logical space for them. They quote the characterization of 
tort law found in Prosser and Keeton’s classic textbook. Torts are 
“civil wrong[s], other than breach[es] of contract, for which the court 
will provide a remedy.”11 Prosser and Keeton, as part of their move 
away from the classical interpretation and towards the newfangled 
Holmesian alternative, ended up rejecting this definition as a way of 
demarcating tort law, but Goldberg and Zipursky endorse it.12 In the 
light of this endorsement, we may legitimately ask them: Where do 
equitable wrongs fit into the classification? They are clearly “civil 
wrong[s] . . . for which the court will provide a remedy.”13 Equally 
clear, they are not breaches of contract. Trusts, nontrust fiduciary 
duties, and confidences may, but need not, be contractually created. 
When they are contractually created, an action for breach of contract 
exists alongside and does not replace the action for breach of trust, 
breach of fiduciary duty, or breach of confidence (as the case may be). 
So should these breaches, these wrongs, be regarded as torts? No. Let 
me explain why not. 
III.   TORTS AND EQUITABLE WRONGS
[C]ompensation is an equitable monetary remedy which is availa-
ble when the equitable remedies of restitution and account are not 
appropriate. By analogy with restitution, it attempts to restore to 
 10.  Particularly effective exposés of the Holmesian mistake in the breach-of-contract 
context are Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989) 
and Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breaches of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947 
(1982) (where a useful catalogue of economistic true-believers may be found).  
 11.  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 920 (alteration in original) (citing W. PAGE 
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 2 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 12.  Id.
 13. Id. 
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the plaintiff what has been lost as a result of the breach, i.e. the 
plaintiff’s lost opportunity. The plaintiff’s actual loss as a conse-
quence of the breach is to be assessed with the full benefit of hind-
sight. Foreseeability is not a concern in assessing compensation, 
but it is essential that the losses made good are only those which, 
on a common sense view of causation, were caused by the breach.14
Let’s temporarily bracket what McLachlin J. says about causation 
and foreseeability. Our immediate concern is with the trio of reme-
dies that she associates with breach of equitable duty. Allow me 
briefly (and crudely) to expand on her taxonomy. 
A.   Restitution 
 As McLachlin J. uses the term, restitution is the return of an as-
set in specie. It reunites one party with the very thing that she lost to 
the other party, thereby extinguishing—in one fell swoop—the one’s 
loss of that thing and the other’s gain of it. An everyday situation 
(usually arising out of an unhappy contractual transaction rather 
than breach of an equitable duty) is that of mutual restitution. You 
have the car; I have the $1000 you paid me for it. Mutual restitution 
involves your returning the car to me and my returning the $1000 to 
you. The abstractness and fungibility of money means, of course, that 
it usually makes little sense to ask whether the $1000 I returned to 
you is the same money that originally changed hands, as opposed to 
just the same amount of money. This fact has licensed a loosening of 
talk about restitution, and now the word is often used to refer to re-
turns of assets no longer in specie. You passed the car to a third party 
in exchange for a painting; so now, instead of asking for the car, I ask 
to have the painting. A court will sometimes “trace” my claim on the 
car through to the painting. The problem is that as the onward 
transactions build up, my loss and your gain increasingly come apart. 
You exchanged a bad car for a good painting, so if I get the painting 
in place of the car, on the basis that you transferred my $1000 car for 
it, I take a $2000 gain off your hands, even though I only lost $1000 
on the car. That example is no longer restitution in the strict sense. 
In fact, there can no longer be restitution in the strict sense unless 
your transaction with the third party is unwound as well. If you have 
to pay me your full $2000 gain, as distinct from the $1000 loss that I 
 14.  Canson Enterprises Ltd. v. Boughton & Co., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534, 556 (Can.). Alt-
hough McLachlin J. was speaking for a concurring minority in Canson, the passage above 
was quoted and endorsed as “good law” by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in his lead speech in 
Target Holdings Ltd. v. Redferns, [1996] 1 A.C. 421 (H.L.) 438-39, and it also found favour 
at the highest level in (for example) Cadbury Schweppes Inc. v. FBI Foods Ltd., [1999] 1 
S.C.R. 142, para. 93 (Can.) and Youyang Pty. Ltd. v Minter Ellison Morris Fletcher (2003) 
212 CLR 484 ¶40 (Austl.).  
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suffered, it is usually better to think of that as a different kind of 
remedy, to which we now turn. 
B.   Account (of Profits) 
 A trustee has a duty to restore to the trust accounts any assets 
that have been displaced from them by his or her breach of trust. Of-
ten there can be restitution in the strict sense, because the trustee 
still has the asset. But a trustee also has a duty to surrender to the 
trust accounts any profits he or she made on a trust asset, whether or 
not it was made by a breach of trust. So if she swapped the trust’s car 
for a painting for herself, she has to hand over the painting, even 
though it is worth $2000, and the car was only worth $1000. And she 
has to hand over the extra $1000 even if she already sold the paint-
ing for $2000 and used $1000 of the proceeds to buy back the car and 
return it faithfully to the trust. Why? Because any profit on dealings 
with a trust asset is automatically impressed with the trust. Dis-
gorgement of this profit, as already indicated, is not restitution in the 
strict sense.15 It extinguishes a gain, but it does not necessarily ex-
tinguish a loss. Any off-accounts profit made by the trustee is repay-
able to the trust even if it would not have accrued to the trust but for 
the off-accounts dealing, i.e., even if the trust is no worse off than it 
would have been had the off-accounts dealing not occurred.16 So there 
need be no loss involved except the notional (“accounting”) loss that is 
constituted by the absence of the gain. That gain, qua gain, is what 
equity chases under the heading of “account,” as McLachlin J. is us-
ing the term.17
 One short path leads off from here to equity’s handling of unjust 
enrichment. The trustee, to repeat, need commit no wrong to incur 
the liability to disgorge a profit, and in that respect, he or she is in 
the same position as someone unjustly enriched (e.g., by the mistake 
of another). But a different, short path connects the disgorgement 
liability of the trustee to the equitable liability of confidants and 
nontrustee fiduciaries. True, one cannot literally extend beyond the 
trust context the idea that the profit on a trust asset is automatically 
 15.  Compare a restitutionary claim against the trustee for the market rental value of 
the car during the period when it was, so to speak, missing from the trust. See also Sarah 
Worthington, Reconsidering Disgorgement for Wrongs, 62 MOD. L. REV. 218 (1999) (compar-
ing the two remedies). In writing this section, Worthington’s analysis has helped me more 
than any other. However, Worthington’s analysis in turn owes much to James Edelman’s 
path-breaking Gain-based Damages: Contract, Tort, Equity, and Intellectual Property,
where the restitution/disgorgement contrast takes pride of place. See JAMES EDELMAN,
GAINED BASED DAMAGES: CONTRACT, TORT, EQUITY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 65-111 (2002). 
 16.  A good example is Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd. v. Maxwell (No. 2),
[1994] 1 All E.R. 261 (Eng.). 
 17. Canson Enterprises Ltd. v. Boughton & Co., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534, 556 (Can.). 
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impressed with the same trust. Information can be held in confi-
dence, but profit cannot. So when equity chases the gain made from 
trading in confidential information or from fiduciary double-dealing 
not involving any use of a trust asset, it does so, not on the footing 
that the gain on an asset automatically belongs to whomever the as-
set belongs to (there is no asset here18), but on the different footing 
that the gain is ill-gotten. There is a duty not to make unauthorized 
profits from these equitable relationships, and the remedy for its 
breach is disgorgement of the very profits made.19 What we have here 
is disgorgement as a remedy for equitable wrongs. 
C.   Compensation 
 What McLachlin J. calls “compensation” is the mirror image of the 
disgorgement remedy just described. The latter remedy aims to elim-
inate gains made by a wrongdoer even when he inflicted no losses; 
the former aims to eliminate losses inflicted by a wrongdoer, even 
when she made no gains. A tort lawyer might be tempted to say that 
what we are dealing with here are compensatory or reparative dam-
ages. But “[w]oe betide” the lawyer who speaks of “damages for 
breach of trust” or “damages for breach of fiduciary duty.”20 McLach-
lin J. offers one reason why these are solecisms: The rules for the as-
sessment of equitable compensation, she says, differ from the rules 
for the assessment of reparative damages at common law.21 In equity, 
she says, “[f]oreseeability is not a concern in assessing compensa-
tion.”22 This claim is contentious,23 and more generally, the differ-
ences in respect of assessment between common law damages and 
 18.  For discussion, see P.M. North, Breach of Confidence: Is There a New Tort?, 12 J.
SOC’Y PUB. TCHRS. L. 149 (1972). 
 19.  On disgorgement for breach of confidence, see Peter Pan Manufacturing Corp. v.
Corsets Silhouette, Ltd., [1964] 1 W.L.R. 96 (Eng.) and Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International 
Corona Resources Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574 (Can.). On disgorgement for breach of fiduciary 
duty, see Furs Ltd. v Tomkies (1936) 54 CLR 583, 592 (Austl.), Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v.
Gulliver, [1967] 2 A.C. 134 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.), and Gwembe Valley Develop-
ment Co. v. Koshy, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 1048 (Eng.), Glazier v Australian Men’s Health (No. 
2) [2001] NSWSC 6. Note that a trustee dealing in assets can be made liable on the ill-
gotten gains theory too, for she, too—indeed, par excellence—is a fiduciary bound by the 
duty not to profit. For discussion of the relationship of these two bases of liability, see Ste-
ven B. Elliott and Charles Mitchell, Remedies for Dishonest Assistance, 67 MOD. L. REV. 16, 
31-32 (2004). 
 20.  Sir Peter Millett, Equity’s Place in the Law of Commerce, 114 LAW Q. REV. 214, 
225 (1998). 
 21.  Canson Enterprises Ltd. v. Boughton & Co., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534, 556 (Can.). 
 22.  Id.
 23.  This was the key point on which McLachlin J.’s concurring minority in Canson
differed from the majority. Also, in Lionel Smith, The Measurement of Compensation 
Claims Against Trustees and Fiduciaries, in EXPLORING PRIVATE LAW 368 (Elise Bant & 
Matthew Harding eds., 2010), McLachlin J. is taken to task (I think wrongly) for thinking 
that “a common sense view of causation” can do without remoteness restrictions. 
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equitable compensation are unsettled.24 Less contention, however, 
attaches to another difference—also brought out by McLachlin J.’s 
remarks—between reparative damages in tort law and compensation 
for equitable wrongs. 
 According to McLachlin J., equity prefers restitution and/or dis-
gorgement and resorts to a reparative award only where these other 
remedies are “not appropriate.”25 Or at any rate, equity prefers resti-
tution, and resorts to reparation only “[b]y analogy with restitu-
tion.”26 Either way, reparation does not have pride of place as a rem-
edy for equitable wrongs. In this respect, the law of torts is different. 
Reparative awards against tortfeasors can be supplemented by the 
court and eschewed by the plaintiff, but they still have pride of place 
as a remedy for tortious wrongdoing. Why is there this difference in 
remedial primacy? Here is one natural explanation, which is the ex-
planation that I favour: The main reason why the defendant has du-
ties to the plaintiff in the law of torts is to protect the plaintiff from 
losses, and the main mode of recourse that a plaintiff has against the 
defendant in a tort case is therefore recourse in respect of his losses.27
This contrasts with the position in equity, where the main reason for 
the defendant’s duties is to secure that the defendant’s dealings are 
conducted for the plaintiff’s advantage and not for the defendant’s 
own. So the emphasis in equity is on the diversion of advantage—in 
the form of assets or profits—as opposed to the causation of loss, 
which is tort law’s first concern. 
 This explanation of the difference between tort remedies and rem-
edies for equitable wrongs may touch a nerve for Goldberg and 
Zipursky. They contrast those who “have placed losses at the center 
of tort theory” with “those who wish to retain a tort theory centered 
on wrongs.”28 They are not sure, on the evidence of my writings, 
 24.  See Bristol & West Building Society v. Mothew, [1997] 2 W.L.R. at 17 (Eng.) and 
Bank of New Zealand v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co. [1999] 1 NZLR 664, 681 (CA), for 
the suggestion that different equitable wrongs go with different assessment rules, some 
more like the common law rules than others.  
 25.  Canson Enterprises Ltd. v. Boughton & Co., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534, 556 (Can.). 
 26.  Id.
 27.  The “therefore” in this sentence is licensed by what I have elsewhere called “the 
continuity thesis,” according to which reasons for not having ?d survive one’s ?ing and are 
now reasons for taking remedial measures. See John Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part 
1: The Place of Corrective Justice, 30 LAW & PHIL. 1 (2011). As I emphasised there, it would 
be better still if one’s ?ing could have been prevented. Id. at 24. Prevention is analytically 
better, ceteris paribus, than a cure. So we should welcome anything that the courts can 
offer by way of tort prevention (e.g., injunctions and exemplary damages). What I am add-
ing in this Article is only that all of this tort prevention rides opportunistically (and discre-
tionarily) on the coat tails of the civil recourse that tort law offers as of right to those who 
have already been wronged, which is a specifically reparative kind of recourse. 
 28.  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 920. 
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where I stand with respect to this supposed divide.29 You can now see 
why. In my view, the divide is artificial. My view is that the wrongs 
of tort law (including those that are actionable without proof of loss) 
exist primarily in order to protect people from loss. This view, which 
calls for a lot of careful unpacking, is both wrong-centred and loss-
centred. For present purposes, however, further unpacking is unnec-
essary. We are not concerned here with how to explain the different 
remedial priorities of the law of torts and the law of equitable 
wrongs. What concerns us here is simply that there are such different 
remedial priorities. Why does this concern us here? Because Goldberg 
and Zipursky call it into question. Since they say nothing at all about 
equitable wrongs, they obviously do not query the claims I just made 
about the primacy of gain-based remedies for equitable wrongs. But 
they do make it their business to query the claims I just made about 
torts. They do not exactly deny, but they certainly put up resistance 
to, the idea that there is a primary or pride-of-place remedy in the 
law of torts, and they resist, in particular, the idea that reparative 
damages is it. 
IV.   THE PRIMACY OF REPARATIVE DAMAGES
 I say that Goldberg and Zipursky “do not exactly deny” the prima-
cy of reparative damages because they agree that “[a] longstanding 
principle of remedies for nonwillful wrongs sets make-whole [repara-
tive damages] as the default remedy.”30 This turns out, however, to be 
both a limited and a double-edged concession. First, “default remedy” 
is too weak to capture the special place of reparative damages in the 
law of torts. Second, “for nonwillful wrongs” already sets the scene for 
the introduction of a rival view. Those who think of the primacy of 
reparative damages as extending more widely are portrayed by Gold-
berg and Zipursky as falling into the trap of mistaking the law of 
negligence for the whole law of torts.31
 The rival view is not long in coming. Goldberg and Zipursky resist 
the idea that reparative damages have a more general remedial pri-
macy in the law of torts by observing that diverse remedies, indeed 
bewilderingly diverse remedies, are commonly granted in tort cases.32
These include injunctions and exemplary (Americans say “punitive”) 
damages, as well as reparative damages.33 Although Goldberg and 
Zipursky do not mention them, we could also add gain-based damag-
 29.  See id. at 928 (citing a draft of Gardner, supra note 27). 
 30.  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 947. 
 31.  See Zipursky, supra note 1, at 752. 
 32.  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 955. 
 33. Id.
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es to the list.34 We could also amplify some of their points. For some 
torts—notably private nuisance and trespass to land—plaintiffs are 
very often less interested in obtaining an award of damages than 
they are in obtaining an injunction against continuation or repetition 
of the tort. Indeed, it is common for plaintiffs in nuisance and tres-
pass-to-land cases not even to claim damages or to claim damages 
only in lieu of an injunction should the court, for some reason, decline 
to issue the injunction sought. Should we conclude that private nui-
sance and trespass to land are not torts? Clearly not. So why, ask 
Goldberg and Zipursky, should we think that torts are characterized 
by the primacy of reparation? Different torts, different scenarios, dif-
ferent remedial devices. 
 This argument proceeds from good observation of legal practice, 
but it misses the point. Even if almost all tort litigation ended in in-
junction, because plaintiffs did not seek damages, reparative damag-
es would still be the common law’s remedy of first resort in the sense 
that we are after. For this is the only remedy against a tortfeasor 
that the successful plaintiff enjoys as of right. Injunctions (an equita-
ble remedy)35 and damages in lieu of injunctions (originally a statuto-
ry equitable remedy)36 are available only in the discretion of the 
 34.  See, e.g., AG v. Blake, [2001] 1 A.C. 268 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (contract 
case, but one in which analogies to tort were suggested obiter). 
 35.  See Cardile v LED Builders Pty. Ltd. (1999) 198 CLR 380, 396 (Austl.); Maggbury 
Pty. Ltd. v Hafele Austl. Pty. Ltd. (2001) 210 CLR 181, 209 (Austl.); Delta Hotels Ltd. v 
Okabe Can. Invs. Co., [1992] ABCA 176, para. 10 (Can.); Law Debenture Trust Corp. v. 
Ural Caspian Oil Corp., [1994] 3 W.L.R. 1221 [172] (Eng.) (Saville L.J.) (where the point 
was of the essence); AG v. Blake, [2001] 1 A.C. 268 (H.L.) 284-85 (Lord Nicholls of Birken-
head); Virgin Atl. v. Premium Aircraft, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1513, [2010] FSR 15, para. 23; 
Roberts v Rodney Dist. Council [2001] 2 NZLR 402 (HC) (N.Z.).  
 36.  The Chancery Amendment Act 1858, also known as Lord Cairns’ Act, gave the 
Court of Chancery jurisdiction to award such remedies, which was later held to have sur-
vived the repeal of the Act in Leeds Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Slack, [1924] A.C. 
851 (H.L.) 852 (appeal taken from Eng.). You may ask how, other than in being discretion-
ary, these damages in lieu of injunction differ from ordinary reparative damages that the 
successful plaintiff enjoys as of right. To see what differentiates them, think about cases in 
which the defendant’s trespass, if allowed to continue, would amount to an expropriation of 
property (e.g., cases of trespass by building on a neighbour’s land). In such cases, injunc-
tions are often granted on the basis that reparative damages would not be an adequate 
remedy, this being one of the established criteria for the discretionary issue of an injunc-
tion. People are free, say the courts, to decide not to alienate their property even if they 
would be amply compensated for doing so; that freedom is of the essence in distinguishing 
property rights from some other rights. But where a trespassory building is already in 
place, the courts may be reluctant to order its demolition (which may strike them as too 
wasteful) and may instead award damages in lieu of the injunction. These are equitable 
damages and may sometimes be calculated on a disgorgement basis. See, e.g., Wrotham 
Park Estate Co. v. Parkside Homes Ltd., [1974] 1 W.L.R. 798 at 814-16 (Eng.). Notice that 
this all begins from the thought that these expropriation-like cases are cases in which the 
primary reparative measure of tort damages is not enough, and that could not be true were 
reparative damages not the primary measure. This all holds equally true in the other 
common law jurisdictions to which the 1858 Act was exported. See, e.g., Madden v
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court. Likewise, exemplary damages37 and disgorgement of profits are 
only available in the discretion of the court.38 This is one way in 
which the law, in all the jurisdictions I am familiar with, distin-
guishes torts from equitable wrongs. Whether equitable wrongs at-
tract any remedy as of right is debatable. Possibly, as McLachlin J. 
hints, all equitable remedies (or all equitable remedies except for 
proprietary remedies against trustees) are discretionary, and possi-
bly that includes even what she casts as equity’s default remedy—
restitution of an asset in specie.39 But leaving aside any dissent that 
Goldberg and Zipursky may be voicing, it is not a matter of any sig-
nificant debate among judges and lawyers—it is “trite law”—that 
torts do attract a particular remedy as of right and that such remedy 
is an award of reparative damages.40
 I say that this is not a matter of any significant debate without 
meaning to suggest that it attracts no sceptical reactions. Andrew 
Burrows, for example, notes the received wisdom that “equitable 
remedies are discretionary whereas common law remedies are not,” 
but he brushes the distinction aside as “highly misleading”: 
It surely cannot seriously be suggested that the law is less cer-
tain—that a judge has more discretion—in deciding whether spe-
cific performance [of a contract] should be ordered than in decid-
ing, in relation to damages, whether a loss is too remote or wheth-
er an intervening cause has broken the chain of causation or 
whether the claimant has filed in its duty to mitigate its loss.41
                                                                                                                  
Kedereski [1983] 1 NSWLR 305 (Austl.); Semelhago v. Paramadevan, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 415, 
paras. 11-12 (Can.); Roberts v Rodney Dist. Council [2001] 2 NZLR 402, para. 28 (HC) 
(N.Z.) (describing the disgorgement measure as “anomalous” in the tort context). 
 37.  See, e.g., Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595 (Can.); Couch v Att’y-Gen.
[2010] 3 NZLR 149 (SC) (N.Z.); Kuddus v. Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary, 
[2001] UKHL 29, [2002] 2 A.C. 122 (appeal taken from Eng.); A v. Bottrill, [2002] UKPC 
44, [2003] 1 A.C. 449 (appeal taken from N.Z.). 
 38.  See AG v. Blake, [2001] 1 A.C. 268 (H.L.) 284-85 (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead). It 
is arguable that Blake awards, available only where an injunction is denied, are better 
classified as damages in lieu of an injunction. Be that as it may, there has been little en-
thusiasm for the decision. Much (award-avoiding) emphasis has been placed on Lord 
Nicholls’ remark that disgorgement awards for common law wrongs are “exceptional.” See, 
e.g., Hospitality Grp. Pty. Ltd. v Austl. Rugby Union Ltd. (2001) 110 FCR 157, 195 (Austl.); 
Bank of America Can. v. Mut. Trust Co., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 601 (Can.). 
 39. Canson Enterprises Ltd. v. Boughton & Co., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534, 547 (Can.). 
 40.  Recent judicial remarks in which this is treated as a trite point not requiring cita-
tion of authority include Anufrijeva v. London Borough of Southwark, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 
1406, [50], [56], [2004] Q.B. 1124 (Eng.), Majrowski v. Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust,
[2006] UKHL 34, [21]-[22] (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead), [46] (Lord Hope of Craighead), 
[2007] 1 A.C. 224 (appeal taken from Eng.), Taunoa v Att’y Gen. [2008] 1 NZLR 429, paras. 
252, 318 (SC) (N.Z.), and Commonwealth v Mewett (1997) 191 CLR 471 (Austl.) (Gummow 
& Kirby, JJ). 
 41.  Andrew Burrows, We Do This at Common Law but That in Equity, 22 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2002). 
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That is quite true, but again it misses the point. A right to reparative 
damages at common law is a right to some reparative damages. The 
job of the court is, inter alia, to determine what the amount is to be. 
The tort plaintiff claims unliquidated damages and the court liqui-
dates them, i.e., crystallises them into a monetary sum, which can 
then be recovered as a judgment debt. I would be the first to agree 
that in doing so the court exercises discretion about a range of mat-
ters bearing on the quantification of loss.42 It even has some discre-
tion about how to conceptualise “loss” for these purposes. But it has 
no discretion about whether to exercise these discretions. It is legally 
bound to make a reparative award of some kind if one is sought by 
the successful plaintiff, because he or she has a right to such an 
award.43 By contrast, the court is not legally bound to issue an in-
junction of any kind, to order any kind of disgorgement of profits, or 
to award any kind of exemplary or punitive damages (even at com-
mon law). 
 How about restitution, a remedy known to common law as well as 
to equity? There are many important tort cases (mainly in conversion 
and trespass to land) in which damages have been awarded on an 
ostensibly restitutionary basis,44 and occasionally the successful 
plaintiff is said to have a right to elect that basis of award.45 The 
proper interpretation of these cases is disputed. At least some of 
them, it is sometimes said, should be reclassified as discretionary 
disgorgement cases.46 Or in at least some of them, it is said, the 
award, although genuinely restitutionary, should be understood as 
remedying an unjust enrichment which occurred in tandem with the 
 42.  Why would I be the first? Because I am a “hard legal positivist”; that is, I am one 
who thinks that when the law invites courts to judge the “reasonableness” of something (or 
to use other evaluative criteria), it necessarily invites courts to step outside the law to 
complete their deliberations, except to the extent that the evaluative criteria have already 
been unpacked by law into nonevaluative ones. For more detail of this view, see John 
Gardner, Justification under Authority, 23 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 71 (2010). 
 43.  There is a general lesson here about rights, both legal and moral. As Joseph Raz 
says, “[a]ssertions of rights are typically intermediate conclusions in arguments from ulti-
mate values to duties. . . . [T]he implications of a right, . . . and the duties it grounds, de-
pend on additional premisses and these cannot in principle be wholly determined in ad-
vance. . . . Because of this rights can be ascribed a dynamic character. They are not merely 
the grounds of existing duties. With changing circumstances they can generate new du-
ties.” JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 181, 185-86 (1986). 
 44.  See, e.g., Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co., (1880) 5 App. Cas. 25 (appeal taken 
from Scot.); Carr-Saunders v. Dick McNeil Assocs. Ltd., [1986] 1 W.L.R. 922; Inverugie 
Invs. Ltd. v Hackett, [1995] 1 W.L.R. 713 at 718-19 (appeal taken from Bah.); Costello v. 
Chief Constable of Derbyshire, [2001] EWCA (Civ) 381, [35], [2001] 1 W.L.R. 1437 (Eng.); 
Severn Trent Water Ltd. v. Barnes. [2004] EWCA (Civ) 570, [22], [33]-[43] (Eng.). 
 45.  United Austl. Ltd. v Barclays Bank, [1941] A.C. 1 (H.L.) 54 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 46.  See AG v. Blake, [2001] 1 A.C. 268 (H.L.) 284-85 (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead). 
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commission of the tort; thus, this is not as a tort remedy at all.47 Fi-
nally, others say that there was indeed a restitutionary award for the 
tort itself in at least some of these cases, but it can be reanalyzed, in 
one way or another, as reparative.48
 Such a reanalysis would not be totally surprising since, as noted 
above, restitution strictu sensu annuls the defendant’s gains and the 
plaintiff’s losses in one fell swoop. Equity is more interested in chas-
ing the defendant’s gain; so in equity, restitution fades into dis-
gorgement. The common law of torts, by contrast, is more interested 
in remedying the plaintiff’s loss and thus tends to emphasise the loss 
side of the restitutionary equation. It is true that in property use cas-
es the courts sometimes have to go to considerable lengths to present 
what they tellingly call “restitutionary damages” as loss-rectifying,49
and in doing so, the courts may even be forced to abandon ways of 
thinking about loss that are standard elsewhere in tort law, even re-
sorting to fictions.50 That they do so is not a sign of cracks appearing 
in the doctrine of the primacy of reparation in the common law of 
torts. It is, on the contrary, a testament to the power of that doctrine. 
The courts are under pressure to find a loss, however understood, to 
which they can attach a quantification, because reparative damages 
are the damages to which the successful plaintiff has a right. 
 Where a tort can be committed without causing a loss (for exam-
ple, trespass or libel), there is, of course, a possible scenario in which 
a plaintiff proves the tort but has no losses to recover, even by an un-
orthodox accounting of losses. Here the court is bound to award nom-
inal damages. Goldberg and Zipursky regard this as another sign 
that reparative damages are not as special as they are made out to 
 47.  See Strand Elec. & Eng’g Co. v. Brisford Entm’ts, [1952] 2 Q.B. 246 at 254-55 
(Denning L.J.) (Eng.); Greenwood v. Bennett, [1973] Q.B. 195 at 202 (Lord Denning M.R.) 
(Eng.); Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Iraqi Airways Co. (Nos. 4 & 5), [2002] UKHL 19, [67], [79], 
[2002] 2 A.C. 883 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead). 
 48.  See Stoke-On-Trent City Council v. W & J Wass Ltd., [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1406 at 
1416 (Eng.); LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, 18TH REPORT, 1971, Cmnd. 4774, ¶ 91 (Eng.). 
 49.  See Harvey McGregor, Restitutionary Damages, in WRONGS AND REMEDIES IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 203, 203 (Peter Birks ed., 1996) (stating that damages should be 
restricted to compensation for loss: “damages for damage”). 
 50.  For lively discussion (with rival proposals for sorting out the mess), see EDELMAN,
supra note 15, at 114-35, and ROBERT STEVENS, TORTS AND RIGHTS 79-84 (2007). Stevens 
suggests that we should think of the damages in most of these cases as “substitutive,” not 
reparative, a distinction that is also drawn by Edelman in Money Awards of the Cost of 
Performance, 4 J. EQUITY 122 (2010) (using the terms “substitutive compensation” and 
“reparative compensation” and crediting the distinction to Steven Elliott). I regard Elliott’s 
proposed “substitution” measure of compensation, not as a rival to the reparative measure, 
but as just one among many possible reparative measures, the choice among which de-
pends on the logic of “next-best conformity” as sketched in Gardner, supra note 27, at 44. 
(On my view, in summary, substitution stands to reparation as terrier stands to dog. Repa-
ration in turn stands to correction as dog stands to canine.). 
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be.51 But again it points the other way. The courts do not regard 
themselves as legally free to deny reparative damages to the plaintiff 
even when there is nothing to repair. The court can, however, express 
the point that there is nothing to repair by awarding a symbolic sum. 
Indeed, the court can go further. It can award such a conspicuously 
trifling sum that it thereby expresses contempt for the plaintiff who 
was such a stickler for his rights that he insisted on upholding them 
expensively and painfully in court even when the defendant’s viola-
tion of them caused him no loss. If the plaintiff had no right to dam-
ages, nominal and contemptuous damages would not be needed and 
would not carry the meanings that they do. The court could simply 
declare that a tort was committed and be done with it. And if the 
plaintiff’s right to damages were not a right to reparative damages, 
how would we explain the fact that nominal (and contemptuous) 
damages are to be awarded only in cases in which the plaintiff proved 
no loss, i.e., had nothing relevant to repair? The explanation is that 
they are not just nominal damages but nominally reparative damag-
es. In that way, the existence of nominal damages confirms rather 
than refutes the primacy of reparative damages as a remedy in the 
law of torts. 
V. NO DUTY TO PAY?
 In buttressing Goldberg and Zipursky’s case against the primacy 
of reparative damages as a remedy in the law of torts, Zipursky (writ-
ing alone) is at great pains to deny that there is a legal duty on tort-
feasors to pay reparative, or indeed any other, damages. “Rather,” he 
says, “the law imposes liability upon a tortfeasor.”52 I am not sure 
what he means. Sometimes he seems to be saying that even after an 
award of reparative damages has been made by the court—even after 
the court has liquidated the plaintiff’s unliquidated claim—there is 
no legal duty on the tortfeasor to pay those damages.53 If that is what 
he means, then he is helping himself to a false contrast between “du-
ty” and “liability.” The primary liability of tortfeasors is none other 
than a liability to be placed under a duty by the court to pay a liqui-
dated sum in reparative damages. Paying that sum is what the court 
orders the defendant to do, on pain of further recourse against him by 
the plaintiff in an action, now not for tort, but for recovery of an un-
 51.  See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 955 (“In some cases without loss, nomi-
nal damages may be the only remedy available.”). 
 52.  Zipursky, supra note 1, at 719 (also cited with apparent approval in Goldberg & 
Zipursky, supra note 1, at 953 n.182). 
 53.  Id. at 698 (“[T]ort judgments represent liabilities, not duties to pay.”). 
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paid judgment debt.54 That this action for recovery of a debt is an ac-
tion for enforcement of a duty to pay can only be doubted by way of a 
further Holmesian heresy with which (I take it) Zipursky would not 
wish to be associated, according to which one has no legal duty to pay 
one’s legally recognised debts. 
 Fortunately, however, Zipursky more often appears to mean some-
thing more limited and less Holmesian by his “no legal duty to pay” 
thesis. He appears to mean only that the tortfeasor has no legal duty 
to pay any reparative damages unless and until ordered to pay them 
by the court.55 I disagree, and with reason,56 but happily the disa-
greement is irrelevant here. Even if the tortfeasor lacks a legal duty 
to pay reparative damages before the court awards a liquidated sum 
in reparative damages against her, that does not alter the fact that 
the court has a legal duty to award a liquidated sum in reparative 
damages against her if the tort is proved. This legal duty exists be-
cause the successful plaintiff has a legal right to reparative (now tak-
en to include nominally reparative) damages. The plaintiff’s right 
grounds a legal duty on the court to impose a new legal duty on the 
tortfeasor, a legal duty that is also grounded (by the court and by the 
law) in the plaintiff’s right. 
VI.   LOCATING THE LAW OF TORTS MORE EXACTLY
 Goldberg and Zipursky’s resistance to the idea that reparative 
damages have a special primacy in the law of torts combines with 
their scattered remarks partly conceding the opposite to yield a pat-
tern of equivocation in their work. If I am right, it is equivocation on 
a point of law on which (in the common law systems I am familiar 
with) no room for equivocation exists. This equivocation by Goldberg 
and Zipursky is patently connected—I am not sure whether as cause 
 54.  This recourse brings with it a new raft of remedies, such as attachment of earn-
ings and seizure of assets. 
 55.  Zipursky, supra note 1, at 720 (stating that a tortfeasor does not have “a free-
standing legal obligation to pay independent of any action against her”). 
 56.  In England and Wales, statutory interest may (and in some circumstances must) 
be awarded on damages awards for the period between the cause of action arising and the 
award of damages by the court, on the basis that “a judgment against the defendant means 
that he should have admitted the claim when it was made and have paid the appropriate 
sum as damages.” LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, SECOND INTERIM REPORT, 1934, [Cmd.] 
4546, ¶ 8. This rationale was approved by the Court of Appeal in Jefford v. Gee, [1970] 2 
Q.B. 130 (C.A.) at 144 (Eng.) and associated with earlier (common law) dicta on the same 
point. On this view an award of tort damages places a retrospective legal duty on the de-
fendant, a duty to have paid the award before it was awarded. Consider, in broad support 
of this view, McLachlin J.’s dictum in Canson, that “viewing the issue of compensation 
from the date of the breach [is] required at common law” (but not, she adds, in equity, 
which looks at losses instead from the date of the trial). Canson Enterprises Ltd. v. 
Boughton & Co., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534, 547 (Can.). 
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or as consequence—with their wish to keep their distance from what 
they call “corrective justice” explanations of tort law. They regard a 
“corrective justice” explanation as a rival to a “civil recourse” expla-
nation; they would rather set up in competition to than in league 
with those such as Jules Coleman,57 Ernest Weinrib,58 Stephen Per-
ry,59 and Arthur Ripstein,60 who emphasize the element of corrective 
justice in tort law. That seems to me to be a mistake—not a legal one 
but a philosophical one. It is a mistake because “corrective justice” is 
an answer to a different question from “civil recourse.” Once we know 
that the law of torts involves civil recourse, we naturally want to 
know what form the recourse takes. “Corrective justice” tells us that 
it takes a primarily corrective form; that the law of torts attempts, 
through the recourse it gives, to put one or both of the parties to the 
proceedings into the same position that they would have been in had 
the wrong, the tort, not been committed. Compare that, if you like, 
with a possible legal regime in which civil recourse takes a primarily 
punitive form, attempting to impose loss on the defendant because of 
some wrong he did, whether or not it thereby corrects any gain or any 
loss that came of the wrongdoing itself. There is no corrective justice 
in that. That is purely retributive justice. Possibly in some jurisdic-
tions the retributive and the corrective are given equal pride of place 
in the award of damages in (what are still called) tort cases. But to go 
this way is to have “lost [one’s] feel for this basic legal category.”61 Or 
so I have claimed in this Article. 
 So it is tempting to render what I have claimed in this Article in 
the following (more theoretically highfalutin) terms. To distinguish 
the law of torts adequately from other branches of law, we need to 
combine the Goldberg and Zipursky “civil recourse” theory of tort law 
with some kind of “corrective justice” theory, such as Coleman’s. This 
restatement of what I have said would give the right general impres-
sion, but it is in several respects misleading. For a start, everything I 
have said above about the law of torts applies equally (mutatis mu-
tandis) to the law of breach of contract, so the manoeuvre of combin-
ing “civil recourse” with “corrective justice” would still not be ade-
quate to distinguish the law of torts from the law of breach of con-
tract. To do that, we would clearly need to add a further criterion on 
 57.  See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 
IND. L.J. 349 (1992). 
 58.  See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485 (1989).  
 59.  See, e.g., Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV.
449 (1992). 
 60.  See, e.g., Arthur Ripstein, As if It Had Never Happened, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1957 (2007).  
 61.  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1. Zipursky may well agree. See his critical re-
marks on the culture of punitive damages in Zipursky, supra note 1, at 751-52.  
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top of “civil recourse” and “corrective justice.” Otherwise we acci-
dentally, and mistakenly, classify breach of contract as a tort. 
 More significantly, however, the combination of “civil recourse” 
and “corrective justice” does not distinguish tort law from the law of 
unjust enrichment or from the law of equitable wrongs. These de-
partments of private law are equally about correcting things, i.e., 
putting one or both of the parties to the proceedings into the same 
position that they would have been had something not gone amiss. 
They just have different things to correct and different ways of cor-
recting them. Corrective justice can be reparative, but it can also be 
disgorgative (excuse the coinage) or restitutionary. So “corrective jus-
tice” does not really help with the specific problem that has been the 
focus of this Article, namely, isolating tort law from its various private 
law neighbours. By the time we get to that problem, we are already 
in the neighbourhood of corrective justice. Two criteria we need to 
add to differentiate tort from two of its close neighbours in the neigh-
bourhood (I have argued) are these: (1) the correction involved in tort 
law is the correction of wrongs (unlike in the law of unjust enrich-
ment), and (2) this correction takes a primarily reparative form (unlike 
in the law of equitable wrongs). But all of this is corrective justice. 
 We could sum up the position that I have sketched in this Article 
by saying that the law of torts is a law: 
 (a) of civil recourse  
 (b) for wrongs 
 (c) in which primarily corrective justice is attempted 
 (d) in a primarily reparative mode  
 (e) in response to claims for unliquidated sums 
 (f) in which the duties breached are noncontractual 
Criterion (a) serves to distinguish the law of torts from criminal law 
and most, if not all, public law. Within private law, criterion (b) keeps 
it apart from the law of unjust enrichment and some parts of the law 
of trustee liability. Criterion (c) makes the contrast between the law 
of torts and a conceivable branch of law in which there is, say, a pri-
marily retributive aim to civil recourse. Criterion (d) keeps the law of 
torts distinct from the law of equitable wrongs. Criterion (e) is need-
ed to draw the distinction—which I have only mentioned in passing—
between the original proceedings to obtain an award of damages 
against the tortfeasor and subsequent proceedings for enforcement of 
the award as a judgment debt (a liquidated sum). More generally, 
criterion (e) means that proceedings for debt recovery are not tort 
proceedings. Finally, criterion (f) serves as a placeholder for some 
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future explanation of why breach of contract is not a tort, even 
though it meets all of the other conditions.62
 Criteria (a), (b), and (f) are endorsed by Goldberg and Zipursky, 
whereas criteria (c), (d), and (e) are not. I suppose they may think 
that (e) is redundant on the basis that actions for debt already fall 
outside tort law thanks to criterion (b). I suggested at the end of Sec-
tion V that this is a mistaken belief; actions for debt, including ac-
tions for enforcement steps to be taken towards recovery of a judg-
ment debt, are premissed on wrongful nonpayment of the debt. More 
central to this Article, however, has been my argument that Goldberg 
and Zipursky’s resistance to (d) involves them in equivocations about 
a settled legal doctrine and that this is bound up with the philosophi-
cal error that Goldberg and Zipursky make in trying to distance 
themselves from (c). Tort law cannot be understood without under-
standing the primacy of the reparative, which entails the primacy of 
the corrective, in its remedial doctrines. The result of their omitting 
these criteria is that, in their work, the law of torts is incompletely 
differentiated from the rest of private law. It follows that the classi-
cal interpretation is incompletely, even though valiantly and insight-
fully, represented. 
VII. WHY IT MATTERS
 You may think there is something decidedly vain—or academic in 
the pejorative sense—about the task of identifying the defining fea-
tures of the law of torts, as my list (a) to (f) purports to do. If true, 
this is bad news for Goldberg and Zipursky, as well as for me. So let 
me end by explaining three reasons why this project is important. 
 First, it is important in the law. Legally, designating some wrong 
as a tort is a way of taking quite a significant body of doctrine off the 
shelf and applying it to that wrong. Not only do we import the right 
to reparative damages, with all of its implications, we also import, as 
McLachlin J. suggests, various standard common law doctrines about 
causation, remoteness, quantification, mitigation of damage, exclu-
sion and limitation of liability, and so on. It is a big question in draft-
ing legislation that creates new civil wrongs and in interpreting such 
legislation whether to make the new wrongs part of the law of torts 
(with all of these potential common law implications) or whether to 
make them freestanding.63 You may say that if this is true then I 
 62.  Although the details cannot be entertained here, my explanation would link the 
distinction between breach of contract and tort to the source of the obligations breached (do 
they or do they not have their source in a contract?), rather than to the remedies available 
for the breach. 
 63.  A plum example is Simpson v Attorney-General [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA), where, 
had it been classified as an action in tort, an action for redress against a public authority 
62 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol 39:43 
should add various other defining features to my list above of (a) to 
(f). I should add criteria about causation, remoteness, quantification, 
mitigation, etc. But that does not follow. Not everything that is a le-
gal implication of making something a tort is, by that token, a defin-
ing feature of the law of torts. There are some legal implications that 
could be present in one legal system but absent in another, although 
both have a law of torts. There are also some implications that could 
change over time without the law of torts being thereby abandoned or 
“lost sight of.” That is important, because when legislation designates 
some wrong as a tort, one consequence is that the legal treatment of 
the wrong will tend to vary with future changes in the law of torts as 
a whole (i.e., changes in its standard common law doctrines). There 
would come a point, however, at which such future changes would 
destabilise the category, by removing defining features in such a way 
as to make the decision to designate something as a tort unintelligible 
to those who come afterwards. Perhaps that has happened in some 
jurisdictions in the United States? That would help to explain the 
otherwise inexplicable rise of the view—which seems illiterate to 
those of us trained in the law of other common law jurisdictions—that 
the law of torts is somehow reimaginable as “the law of accidents.” 
 You will notice that I have just opened up some space for Goldberg 
and Zipursky to resist my charge of equivocation about the law. 
“True,” they might say, “reparative damages are the only remedy 
available as of right in the common law of torts. We never meant to 
deny it. But it does not follow that this is a defining feature of the 
law of torts. Some legal implications of making something a tort, as 
you say, are not defining features of the law of torts.” This is a possi-
ble line of response. I have tried, however, to preempt it in this Arti-
cle by suggesting that if we do not include the right to reparative 
damages as one of its defining features, the law of torts is insuffi-
ciently differentiated from some nearby branches of law, notably, the 
law of equitable wrongs. Goldberg and Zipursky may reply that this 
is a question-begging enterprise. It is an open question how much 
differentiation one needs or at least how much differentiation one 
should expect to achieve before concluding that the rest is an acci-
dent of history. I agree. In a sense, indeed, everything we are discuss-
ing is an accident of history. The law could have developed in other 
ways, and we could have ended up with differently differentiated ar-
eas of law. There need never have been a law of torts; it is an acci-
dent of history that there is one and that there is, for example, a law 
of contract, trusts, and unjust enrichment. All I would add is that the 
                                                                                                                  
under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 would have failed owing to crown immunity 
under the Crown Proceedings Act 1950. 
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law of torts, for all its happenstance, has not simply bequeathed a 
more or less miscellaneous list of torts. It has also bequeathed a more 
or less miscellaneous list of features in virtue of which, according to 
the law, torts qualify as torts—a list which I have tried to summarise 
as (a) to (f). Why add “accident of history” to the list? The list itself is 
the accident of history. 
 This brings us to a second reason, related to the first, for pausing 
to identify the defining features of tort law. As areas of law take 
shape, they also take root. Each develops its own way of differentiat-
ing itself and its own related way of accounting for itself. Further, 
each develops a rationale or, more often, a set of connected but partly 
competing rationales for its own existence. There are then, as it were, 
local narratives available to the courts in justifying particular fea-
tures of the law in that area, as well as in justifying changes to those 
features of the law. Sometimes these changes include changes to the 
very criteria by which the relevant area of the law is identified and 
thus differentiated from other nearby areas. There is no timelessness 
and no inevitability to these differentiations. But that is not to say 
that they can be casually dispensed with. You may think that if some 
rational resources are good for the law’s development, then more ra-
tional resources must be better, so that breaking down the bounda-
ries between areas of law can only increase the richness of the avail-
able narratives and hence make for law that is increasingly respon-
sive to reality or decreasingly cut off from it. This is incorrect. Narra-
tive coherence is not scalable.64 Growing indifferent to the established 
legal differences between torts and equitable wrongs or becoming ra-
tionalistically fixated with harmonising contract with tort is apt to 
create an incomprehensible brouhaha—not a more unified narrative, 
not a bigger choice of narratives, but no intelligible narrative at all. 
And with no narrative, there is no future for development of the law 
by legal argumentation. 
 This is not a manifesto for keeping the law as it is. The law of 
torts is the common law’s main offering for dealing with quite a wide 
range of social problems and personal conflicts. We may reasonably 
wonder whether it is (still) up to the task of dealing with them or 
whether it needs to be reformed or replaced. Before we can work out 
whether it is up to the task, however, we need to know what exactly 
it is.  
 This brings us to a third reason for caring about the defining fea-
tures of tort law. How can there be tort law reform if we have lost 
 64.  For useful reflections, see Barbara Baum Levenbook, The Role of Coherence in 
Legal Reasoning, 3 LAW & PHIL. 355 (1984).
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sight of what tort law is? If politicians and pundits think it is “the 
law of accidents,” will they not just run amuck with their so-called 
reform proposals, aiming at the wrong targets, firing in crazy direc-
tions, and doing more collateral damage to the law in the process 
than will ever be compensated by any improvements that they may 
secure? Yes, they will, and they do. Many well-meaning people pro-
posing improvements to the law of torts fall at the very first hurdle of 
not having much of an idea of what the law of torts is. Maybe they 
think of it as another name for “compensation culture,” “ambulance-
chasing lawyers,” or “class-action racketeering.” I do not suggest for 
one moment that Goldberg and Zipursky’s conceptual work, let alone 
my own, will help to solve this problem. Possibly the people who har-
bour such wild misconceptions are not much interested in being put 
right or do not have the time, inclination, or patience to read the 
scholarly literature or even to have it explained to them. But scholar-
ly writing about the law does not have to justify itself by showing its 
actual influence on anybody. It has to justify itself by showing that 
its influence would be good if, by chance, it had any. Subject to the 
narrow criticisms I have made in this Article, Goldberg and 
Zipursky’s joint work on tort law amply meets this condition. 
